Abstract. The need for enterprise application integration projects leads to complex composite applications. For the sake of security and efficiency, consolidated access control policies for composite applications should be provided. Such a policy is based on the policies of the corresponding autonomous sub-applications and has the following properties: On the one hand, it needs to be as restrictive as possible to block requests which do not comply with the integrated sub-applications' policies. Thereby, unsuccessful executions of requests are prevented at an early stage. On the other hand, the composite policy must grant all necessary privileges in order to make the intended functionality available to legitimate users. In this paper, we present our formal model and respective algorithmic solutions for consolidating the access control of composite applications. The generated policies conform to the presented requirements of the least privileges paradigm and, thus, allow to revise and optimize the access control of composite applications. We demonstrate this by means of Web service workflows that constitute the state of the art for the realization of business processes.
Introduction
Composite applications are applications that rely on sub-applications (also called sub-activities) to integrate their functionality. There are numerous examples for such applications including quite simple Web applications as well as large scale enterprise resource planning systems (ERP) that rely on database backends. Also, business processes that are realized as Web service workflows constitute complex composite applications. In general, sub-applications are self-contained software components, like Web services that autonomously enforce their own security policy. When integrating autonomous sub-activities into workflows, security dependencies must be considered. As an example consider the e-health workflow illustrated in Figure 1 that will be executed when a patient is transferred to the cardiology department of a hospital. Depending on the diagnostic findings, either an in-patient treatment is applied or an electrocardiogram (ECG) is made in order to acquire further insight. Each of the individual sub-activities that are depicted in the figure are autonomously enforcing their security policies. In case, these policies are not consolidated, reliable workflow execution might be hindered. Administrative employees, for instance, are allowed to query the medical records of patients, but are not permitted to perform any medical treatment. Thus, requests might be authorized by some sub-activities but rejected by others, which results in performance drawbacks due to unsuccessful workflow executions and can require transaction rollbacks or costly compensating actions.
In order to perform an early-filtering of the requests to avoid unsuccessful executions, a consolidated view onto the access control of workflows or general composite applications is needed. Thereby, we can identify two different perspectives onto the security configuration of a composite application. From the security officer's point of view, access control should be defined as tight as possible to avoid security vulnerabilities. Too restrictive policies on the other hand can hinder legitimate users to execute the application which contradicts the processcentered viewpoint of the application developer. Therefore, a consolidated policy is required that is tailored to the functionality of the composite application. The consolidation process derives the following information: (1) what are the least required privileges for the execution of the composite application and (2) who is granted these privileges. The first aspect allows to meet the security officer's requirements by defining access rules and role profiles that are restricted to the functionality of the composite application. The second supports the application developer in detecting unintended configurations. For instance, if only highly privileged users (e.g., administrators) are authorized to perform the workflow, this might be an indication for the design of the application itself having to be revised.
In [1] we presented a security engineering approach for optimizing the access control of Web service compositions by determining the maximum set of authorized subjects. As we will show in this paper, in order to treat generic composite applications, privilege relaxation tests are required in addition. Our contributions are a formal model and corresponding algorithmic solutions for the consolidation of the access control of generic composite applications. The consolidation is performed from the single-user / single-role-perspective, meaning that a user can execute the application by the activation of one task specific role. This complies with most business processes, which are typically representing job specific functions and are thus designed for specific groups of employees.
The remainder of this contribution is structured as follows: Section 2 introduces the syntax and semantics of our policy algebra, which constitutes the basis of the policy consolidation approach presented in Section 3. In Section 4 elementary algorithms of the policy consolidation process are described. Section 5 gives an overview over related work and Section 6 concludes the paper.
Policy Model
First, we introduce the policy algebra which constitutes the basis for the formal specification of the proposed policy consolidation technique. Policies are described in an attribute based way and are not restricted to identity based description. For instance, subjects can be specified through characterizing properties like role-membership, age, profession skills and so on. The policy model allows to express discretionary access control (DAC) rules and supports role based access control (RBAC) models which are suitable security concepts for almost all commercial applications. The formal syntax and semantics of our policy model are based on those introduced by Bonatti et al. [2] . We adapted and extended this model where necessary, e.g., by introducing additional operators.
Notation
Predicates A predicate defines an attribute comparison of the form (attribute-identifier • constant). Depending on the attribute's domain, the comparison operator • is in {<, ≤, =, ≥, >} for totally ordered sets and in { , , =, , } for partially ordered finite sets.
Subjects, objects, actions, and conditions Let Attr be the set of distinguished attribute identifiers. Attr is subdivided into disjoint sets of subject, object, action, and environment attribute identifiers (denoted as S-Attr, O-Attr, A-Attr, and E-Attr respectively). A set of subjects S is represented by a disjunction of predicate conjunctions over S-Attr. That is, S = ((
with each s i,d being a predicate conjunction that applies to one attribute. The cardinality of S-Attr is denoted by l. The elements of S-Attr are also called dimensions of a subject specification. Representations of objects O and actions A are defined in a similar way. S, O, and A are inequality-free. A condition c is a boolean formula defined over attributes of E-Attr that can include user defined functions with Boolean codomain (e.g., isWeekday(date)).
Rules and policies A rule R is a quadruple (S, O, A, c), consisting of specifications of subjects S, objects O, and actions A. A rule assigns a set of permissions specified by (O, A) to a set of subjects. The scope of the assignment is restricted through c. Individual rules R 1 , . . . , R n can be aggregated in a policy P = {R 1 , . . . , R n }. Projection Let R = (S, O, A, c) be a rule. The projection on the subjects part of R is defined as
Evaluation context
Other projection operators on policies are defined in a similar way. We use the abbreviation S(P ) = 1≤i≤n Π S (R i ) to denote those subjects that are granted all privileges defined in P . 
for any evaluation context e. Analogously, a rule R relaxes a rule R, R R , iff it grants more or the same privileges to more or the same users under the same or less restrictive conditions. That is, ∀e ∈ E with (
pe-alg e = true).
Reduced policies In order to efficiently consolidate the policy of composite applications we are focussing on reduced policies as motivated in Section 3.1: Let the applied policy evaluation algorithm be pe-all. P is called reduced, iff
A policy fulfilling (2) but not (1) can be reduced as follows:
Role Based Access Control
Policy administration can easily become unmanageable if privileges are independently assigned to each user. Scalability is provided through role based access control (RBAC, see [3] and [4] ). Using RBAC, privileges required for performing a certain task are grouped by roles. Users acquire these privileges via the indirection of being granted those roles. Roles can be organized in a hierarchy that defines a partial order. Senior roles, which are at higher levels in the hierarchy, inherit all privileges that are granted to their junior roles. To give an 
Policy Consolidation

Problem Specification
Let App 1 , . . . , App N be N ≥ 1 (autonomous) sub-activities of the composite application App 0 and P i be the policy that applies to App i (for 1 ≤ i ≤ N ). We equate the permission to execute the i th sub-activity with the set of privileges that apply to the accesses performed by App i (which itself can be a composite application, too). These are defined by Π O,A (P i ). In order to enforce all of these access rights, we use pe-all as evaluation algorithm. We assume P i to be a reduced policy. Thus, as defined in Section 2.2, P i has the following two characteristics: First, the privileges defined in P i are disjoint. This property can be assured through the preprocessing described in Section 2.2. Second, its rules apply to the same set of subjects. In some cases it might be required, that the privileges Π O,A (P i ) are granted to different groups of users under distinguished conditions. In order to efficiently process the set of constraints, the policy is decomposed into policies conforming to Section 2.2 that are evaluated individually.
Let P 0 be the reduced policy for App 0 . In many cases, there might be no predefined policy for App 0 , i.e., P 0 is equivalent to Υ . Nevertheless, policy prototypes can be pre-defined specifying intended configurations. The objective of the policy consolidation process is to evaluate P 0 against the policies of the underlying applications. Its result is an optimized policy P opt that fulfills the following two criteria:
LP Least privilege criterion: Each privilege defined in P opt must also be defined in at least one policy P i with 1 ≤ i ≤ N . The privileges defined in P opt must be sufficient to perform App 0 and its respective sub-activities.
MS Maximum set of subjects criterion:
Each subject that is authorized based on the original policy configurations (P i ) 0≤i≤N must also be authorized by P opt . Each subject that is defined in P opt must also be defined in at least one policy P i with 1 ≤ i ≤ N and in P 0 .
Workflow Dependencies
Sub-activities of a composite application can for example be executed in sequence or in parallel. Also, iterations (i.e., loops) are possible. From an access control point of view it is of importance that all sub-activities will be performed. We represent this fact through the Sequence pattern. Furthermore, conditional and event based executions can be defined. From the access control perspective this denotes that only one sub-activity will be invoked, which we represent through the so-called Switch template. Sequence and Switch templates can be nested to model complex workflows. Apart from these kinds of control flow dependencies further interdependencies influencing access control can exist: a) Data-flow dependencies are given, if an output parameter x of a sub-activity App i is input to App j and the value of x determines the result of the evaluation of the policy P j . b) External dependencies are dependencies by parameters external to the system, like time. For example, P i and P j might define time constraints that restrict the execution of App i and App j to disjoint time frames. That is, the conjunction of conditions defined in P i and P j respectively constitute a contradiction. Nevertheless, the control-flow can be consistent due to the execution order (e.g., think of delays during long-running transactions).
We first describe the consolidation of access control policies for the two patterns Sequence and Switch before we return to discuss the influence of interdependencies a) and b).
Analysis of Sequence Patterns
For a Sequence pattern to be consistent from the access control perspective, the following two conditions must be met: First, the access rights defined in P 0 must include those privileges defined in the policies (P i ) 1≤i≤N . Second, there must be at least one subject that is granted these privileges. Otherwise, the access specifications are conflicting, preventing the execution of App 0 . Formally:
The consolidated policy P opt (all) is defined as:
The applied evaluation algorithm is pe-all. If the policies (P i ) 1≤i≤N fulfill LP, then LP can also be inferred for P opt (all) , as the privileges in P opt (all) are restricted to those defined in (P i ) 1≤i≤N and its rules are constrained through conjunctions of the respective conditions defined in these policies and P 0 . Sub-activities can perform similar accesses on the same objects, like scans of the same tables of a database. Thus, P opt (all) -which aggregates the privileges defined in (P i ) 1≤i≤N -might contain redundancies that can be eliminated according to Section 2.2.
Analysis of Switch Patterns
The access control configurations for Switch patterns can be defined from two different perspectives. The full-authorization approach enforces each subject defined in the consolidated policy to be authorized for any of the (App i ) 1≤i≤N , irrespective which sub-activity will actually be executed. As a consequence, the consolidated policy corresponds to P opt (all) defined in the previous paragraph. On the opposite side, partial-authorization distinguishes the different execution paths. Subjects might be authorized to execute App 0 in case a particular App i is invoked next, but will be blocked in any other case. Thus, in order to efficiently evaluate a Switch pattern the distinguished execution branches have to be analyzed separately. Consequently, up to N security configurations have to be considered. In order to specify the optimized policy for the i th branch, the policies P 0 and P i are consolidated and the following must be true:
The consolidated policy for the i th branch (using pe-all ) is defined as:
The Benefits of Policy Consolidation
The policy consolidation technique performs a static analysis of the policy of a composite application App 0 by comparing it with the security configuration of its underlying sub-activities App 1 , . . . , App N . Its result is an optimized policy P opt for App 0 and all sub-activities (P opt = P opt (all) ) or specific branches App 0 → App i (P opt = P opt (i) ), respectively. In case no external or dataflow dependencies exist, the access control costs can be reduced significantly. As each execution which is granted based on P opt will also be granted by the sub-activities, it is sufficient to enforce access control solely at App 0 , thus, saving redundant enforcements through the sub-activities. In case interdependencies 3.2.a) or 3.2.b) have to be considered at runtime, no single point of access control can be established. Nevertheless, the static analysis allows to receive a consolidated view onto the set of authorized users (MS) and the least required privileges (LP) enabling the following optimizations:
Evaluation of MS: S(P
opt ) specifies those subjects that are authorized to execute the workflow (branch) or general composite application, respectively. It allows application developers to check more easily whether the policy complies with the intended security specifications, e.g., detecting over-privileged users or conflicts. Furthermore, in case role based access control is employed, least required roles can be inferred. In this regard, a least required role is a role that grants process execution without demanding for further intermediary role activations. This "one role will do"-approach is especially relevant for business processes that are typically defined for specific job functions. Least required roles are identified through the predicate reduction introduced in Alg. 1 and are unique for limited role hierarchies but not necessarily for general role hierarchies. For example, the infima of the role hierarchy shown in Figure 2 (b) are r 1 and r 2 . The respective least required roles are least common senior roles, i.e., r 4 and r 5 in the example.
Evaluation of LP:
Π O,A (P opt ) represents the aggregated set of privileges tailored to the access requirements of the composite application. In the meaning of a reverse security engineering, this information allows to generate task specific roles which are appropriate for the application. They are called task specific as they group exactly those rights that are required for the composite application's functionality (while least required roles can be more generic).
Case Study: Web Service Workflows
Sub-activities of the intra-organizational workflow illustrated in Figure 1 on the one hand represent practical activities that require human interaction like a medication. On the other hand, they stand for information processing tasks, like an update of the stock of pharmaceuticals in the database. In the following we concentrate on the technical aspects of the workflow and assume the subactivities to be realized as Web services with the following access rules:
-Health personnel with permanent employment and administrative personnel are allowed to access the medical records of patients. The subject specification S MR applying to the sub-activity query medical records is defined as S App = (role Internist). -The sub-activity apply medication can be performed by nurses and physicians: S Med = ((role Nurse) ∨ (role Physician)).
As motivated in Section 3.2, the workflow can be modeled as a composition of Sequence and Switch patterns. This allows the authorization dependencies of the workflow to be represented as a tree as shown in Figure 3 . Through a bottomup analysis, the consolidated access control configuration for the workflow can be inferred. Typically, no access control policies are defined for the control structures -i.e, P 0 ≡ Υ for Sequence and Switch nodes. Hence, the privileges defined for the individual Web services, are iteratively aggregated without demanding for relaxation tests. We thus focus on determining the set of authorized users which proceeds as follows: First, S App and S Med are intersected as both sub-activities are linked in sequence. It holds S App ∧ S Med = (role Internist). Next, the Switch node is evaluated. The subjects that are granted full-authorization are defined by S = (role Internist). In contrast to this, nurses are only granted partial authorization for the ECG-branch: S = (role Nurse∧field-of-activity = cardiology). Finally, S and S have to be intersected with S MR . We receive:
Thus, the workflow is executable for nurses and internists, whereby nurses are only granted partial authorization. This allows the following optimization of access control at the workflow layer: Internists that fulfill the specification of S all need only be authorized at the workflow layer. For nurses, access control has to be performed twice: On top of the workflow layer and when entering the Switch part. All other subjects, like those granted the Administrative Personnel role, can be blocked right from the beginning, as they will never succeed in reaching an end state of the workflow. The optimization capabilities can be realized to the maximum extent possible, if the access control of the sub-activities can be controlled by the composite application, for instance by building up a security context between the workflow execution system and the autonomous services, e.g., employing WS-SecureConversation [5] . In any case, policy enforcement at the workflow layer helps to reduce unnecessary service executions, transaction rollbacks and compensating actions.
Algorithmic Solutions
For an implementation of the described policy consolidation technique, algorithmic solutions for the evaluation of predicate conjunctions and subtractions, and the validation of privilege relaxation are required.
Implementing the Conjunction Operator
Equations (2) and (5) introduce S all and S (i) as conjunctions of subject specifications. The conjunction operator is semantically equivalent to the set theoretical intersection operator. That is, S all and S (i) can be interpreted as the intersection of subject sets. Let S and S be two subject specifications. According to the policy model, S and S are represented via disjunctions of predicate conjunctions over attributes in S-Attr :
The attributes in S-Attr are also called the dimensions of subject specifications. We assume all dimensions in S and S to be specified. If a conjunction s i is not constrained in dimension d, then the respective predicate s i,d represents the whole domain of d. According to Section 2.2 the intersection of S and
for all dimensions d = 1 . . . l do 5:
end for 7:
end
) can be contradictory, i.e., unsatisfiable by any evaluation context. Such terms constitute unnecessary parts of a policy and shall be omitted to keep policy specifications clear. Alg. 1 illustrates an approach for computing a condensed representation of S ∧ S . We illustrate the algorithm by means of an example. Consider the following two subject descriptions (based on the example role hierarchy shown in Figure 2 (a)):
S represents all subjects that are granted the Nurse role and that have at least one year of practice (abbrev. yop). S represents administrative employees and all subjects that are granted senior roles of the Health Personnel role with at least two and at most four years of practice. Thus, the dimensions are role and yop. While the domain of role is a finite lattice (defined by the role hierarchy shown in Figure 2(a) ), the domain of yop is [0, +∞[. The terms s 1 and s 1 are disjoint, because they do not overlap in the roledimension, i.e., (s 1,role ∧ s 1,role ) is a contradiction and needs not be considered in line 7. In contrast to this, s 1 and s 2 overlap in each dimension. The conjunction 
. That is, the intersection consists of those subjects that are granted the Nurse role and that have at least two and at most four years of practice.
Checking Privilege Relaxation
Let (O, A) and (O , A ) be two privileges. As objects and actions are defined on disjoint sets of attribute identifiers (O-Attr and A-Attr, see Section 2.1) and according to the definition of privilege relaxation (Section 2.2), (O , A ) relaxes
return ti // ti and t j represent disjoint data sets 7:
end if 11: end for 12: return DNF of δ // ω in line 8 is a predicate disjunction states that the complete table can be accessed via select. The second restricts the select-access to the data of female health care employees that earn more than 50 $ and less than 100 $. We use the symbol ⊥ to represent unrestricted attribute values. The object specifications of both privileges are represented by the following two predicate conjunctions:
It can easily be verified that t relaxes t . Let's assume that on the other way round it shall be examined whether t relaxes t, which is obviously not the case. The following table shows the evaluation steps of subtract, in case the attributes are processed in the order Name, Gender, Salary, and Job.
Variable work Remainders
When comparing the terms in the Salary-dimension t divides work into three components, the overlapping part and two remainder predicates δ 2 and δ 3 . This is the maximum number of remainder predicates that can be generated in one step if the attribute's domain is a totally ordered uncountable set (the domain of Salary is [0, +∞[). Things are different if the attribute's domain is a partially ordered finite set, as is the case for the dimension Job. Instead of enumerating all attribute values (AP and TP ) in distinct predicates, the internal representation is an aggregate of the form (jo ∈ {AP, TP}) as illustrated in the table.
As a consequence, a comparison of two predicate conjunctions results in up to 2l remainder predicate conjunctions in the worst case. As each of these are individually compared with T (line 8 of Alg. 2) this leads to an exponential worst case complexity of implies w.r.t. the input parameter k . Thus, the described privilege implication problem is closely related to other well known computationally hard issues like query subsumption or the satisfiability problem [6] . Nevertheless, the worst case is supposed to arrive rarely. This is due to the fact that, for the worst case to occur, privileges have to be described through distinguished, partially overlapping predicate conjunctions -which would be the case if policies are written in a complex (unstructured and almost unmanageable) way. Instead, average complexity is assumed to be close to the best case complexity, which is in polynomial time.
Implementing the Subtraction Operator
The semantics of the subtraction of two terms T and T are defined as
. Thus, the subtraction operator can be realized through the already presented algorithm implies (Alg. 2), as the remainder ∆ of implies(T, T ) is equivalent to T − T .
Related Literature
In Section 2 we defined the policy model that constitutes the basis for the specification of our proposed policy consolidation technique. Syntax and semantics of this policy model are closely related to those proposed by Bonatti et al. [2] and Wijesekera and Jajodia [7] . We extended them through additional operators and relaxation rules for defining policy consolidation. The access control policy of a composite application is composed of rules that codify the individual access rights that relate to the underlying sub-activities. The enforcement of such a policy depends on the applied evaluation algorithm. If negative or mixed authorization should be employed, which could be expressed in our model as well by means of the subtraction operator, conflict resolution techniques like those proposed by Jajodia et al. [8] have to be employed. In this work we focussed on positive authorization which is suitable for almost all enterprise applications.
Our work is also related to research on models for the specification and analysis of workflow processes. Adam et al. [9] use Petri-nets to model and evaluate control flow dependencies. Bettini et al. [10] identify temporal constraints that might cause inconsistencies which restrict the executability of workflows. Temporal constraints must also be considered when interpreting the result of the static policy analysis (see 3.2.b)). Nevertheless, even if dynamic dependencies have to be evaluated at runtime, policy consolidation still offers optimization potential. The composed policy allows to perform access control at the workflow layer, filtering unsuccessful execution attempts as early as possible. The enforcement of access rules at the workflow layer is also proposed by Gudes et al. [11] . Access control models and architectures for workflow systems are for example proposed by [12, 13] and [14] . Atluri et al. [13] present an approach for analyzing dependencies between sub-activities that operate on the same data but are assigned to different security levels. A framework supporting static and dynamic separation of duties is provided by Bertino et al. [14] . In contrast to this, we concentrate on single-user /single-role execution schemes which we assume to be prevalent for most enterprise applications. Identifying the set of authorized users of com-posite applications was also addressed in previous work [15] . There, a practical approach was shown, how task-specific user profiles and roles can be determined by analyzing the source code. In this paper we presented a generic, implementation independent policy consolidation framework which also supports the reverse engineering of appropriate user / role profiles by determining the least required privileges. Compliance with LP can be inferred if the policies of the underlying sub-activities have been preprocessed and minimized. How this can be achieved for Web services that rely on database interaction has been shown in foregoing work [16] .
Conclusions and Ongoing Work
As motivated in the beginning of this paper, introducing access control on the layer of composite applications that depend on autonomous sub-applications can be employed to filter unsuccessful execution attempts as early as possible, thus, avoiding unnecessary work. Additionally, a consolidated view onto the access control of a composite application allows to revise the security configuration by restricting it to the applications' functionality. Further optimization potential is given, in case the access control of the underlying sub-activities can be regulated through the composite application.
Based on the formal specification of policy consolidation, a prototype has been implemented to show its feasibility regarding the consolidation of the access control of Web service workflows. We employ XACML as policy language which due to the attribute based description of access rules is well suited to map our policy model. Workflows are specified using BPEL4WS. Currently, we are working on the integration of the consolidation functionality in a business process modeling tool [17] and the extension of the prototype to support all kinds of policy consolidations as described in Section 3 of this paper.
